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Given the renewed interest in negative interest rates as a means for overcoming the zero 
bound on nominal interest rates, this article reviews the history of negative nominal interest 
rates and gives a brief survey over the current proposals that received popular attention in the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2007/08. It is demonstrated that ‘taxing money’ proposals have a 
long intellectual history and that instead of being the conjecture of a monetary crank, they are 
a serious policy proposal. In a second step the article points out that, besides the more popular 
debate on a Gesell tax as a means to remove the zero bound on nominal interest rates, there is 
a class of neoclassical search-models that advocates a negative tax on money as efficiency 
enhancing. This strand of the literature has so far been largely ignored by the policy debate on 
negative interest rates.  
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The current recession is without doubt the most serious economic crisis since the end of 
World War II, a real ‘once-in-a-century event’ (IMF, 2009, p. 3). Nearly three years after the 
onset of the crisis, most central bank base rates are still close to zero, with high although 
eventually  diminishing  interest  spreads  on  financial  markets.  Investment  and  capacity 
utilization however have remained far below normal levels in many industrial states. With 
central  banks’  base  rates  approaching  zero,  conventional  monetary  policy  has  run  out  of 
option concerning the reduction of market interest rates which is necessary to revive the ailing 
economy. Being left with no other option, central banks around the world have turned to a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative easing,
1 policies whose success in reviving the 
economy have been fairly small, especially in the United States.    
Thus, Gregory Mankiw (2009), in an article in the New York Times, reflected on the 
possibility of negative interest rates as a way to revive lending. The idea might seem absurd at 
first glance, but, as Mankiw’ points out, the same applied to the idea of negative numbers, 
which were rejected by early mathematicians as impossibility. Indeed, in an internal study, the 
Federal Reserve Bank specified the ideal interest rate at minus five percent (Guha, 2009) and 
the Swedish central bank actually cut its deposit rate to minus 0.25% at the height of the crisis 
(Sveriges Riksbank, 2009). Thus, the financial crisis fired a monetary policy debate that took 
place mainly in the blogosphere, in parliamentary or congressional evidence or in speeches 
(see for further references Buiter, 2010, p. 216). As a consequence negative interest rates 
received popular attention beyond the small group of academics who have worked on the 
issue since the millennium. 
In fact, the (academic) debate on negative interest rates stretches back over more than a 
century to the late 19
th century. Silvio Gesell is widely accredited to be the first proponent of 
negative nominal interest rates.
 Gesell’s ideas have attracted a small, but convinced group of 
followers, and he must be regarded as the founding father of a persistent social movement: 
the  Freiwirtschaftsbewegung  (free-economy  movement).
2  And  even  if  his  proposal  of  a 
negative tax on money was never adopted on a large scale, there were some regional 
initiatives during the Great Depression.
3  Moreover, in the course of the 20
th century, Gesell’s 
idea was taken up by various prominent economists such as Irving Fisher and John Maynard 
Keynes. Indeed, Fisher was a stout proponent of taxing money (‘stamp script’) which he saw as 
                                                           
1 See Buiter (2009) for a suggested distinction between the two. 




a  feasible method  for  reflating  the  economy of  the  1930s,  and  Keynes  endorsed  parts of 
Gesell’s theoretical reasoning, calling him a ‘strange, unduly neglected prophet’ (Keynes 1936, 
p. 353). 
Nonetheless, during the post war era, orthodox authors have paid little attention to the 
possibility of negative interest rates, and scholars of the history of economic thought have 
called  Gesell  a  ‘typical  monetary  crank’  (Garvy,  1975,  p.  392).  Recently,  however,  Japan’s 
experience of persistent deflationary pressure and economic stagnation, instigated a handful 
of scholars to re-examine Gesell’s idea of taxing money as a means of overcoming the zero 
bound on interest rates. While these authors have made repeated references to Gesell as the 
first proponent of negative interest rates, they pay little attention to his economic theory. 
Consequently, this literature examined the benefits of negative interest rates in Walrasian 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, in which money is not necessary for 
the efficient allocation of resources.  
Hence, in the policy debate, only models where money has no allocative effect and is thus 
neutral were used to justify the call for negative interest rates. In fact, most of their advocates 
had  overlooked  that  there  is  another  class  of  models  that  considers  a  tax  on  money  as 
efficiency enhancing. The common feature of these monetary search models, which build on 
the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), is that they set up an environment 
where money eases bilateral trade by eliminating the need for a double coincidence of wants. 
Hence, money plays an essential role in the sense that some of the allocations achievable in a 
monetary  equilibrium  cannot  be  achieved  in  a  barter  economy,  and  therefore  the  use  of 
money increases welfare. Nevertheless, monetary economies can still suffer from several kinds 
of inefficiencies. In early applications of search-models researchers considered a tax on money 
as a ‘proxy for inflation’, and in some examples as a means to overcome inefficiencies in the 
monetary exchange process. These authors were seemingly unaware of Gesell and the zero 
bound and did not have in mind negative interest rates as an additional policy tool as in the 
current  debate.  Modelling  advances  made  the  ‘proxy  for  inflation’  role  of  money  taxes 
obsolete, since the effects of inflation could now be studied directly. Since a tax on money had 
not been not recognized as a policy instrument itself, its efficiency enhancing role has not been 
studied further in modern search models.
4  
                                                           
4 In a companion paper (Menner, 2010), one of us takes a new hold on the efficiency properties of a tax on money 
in a last-generation search-model, as well as on its effectiveness to foster output and employment in a recession 
scenario, and on its role to achieve negative nominal interest rates.  
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Thus,  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  give  a  concise  review  of  the  various  strands  of  the 
literature dealing with negative interest rates from past to present.  We show that, besides its 
anarchistic  origins,  there  are  two  orthodox  strands  of  research  that  show  the  potentially 
beneficial effects of negative interest rates, but have so far been unconnected in the literature.  
By  highlighting  the  diverse  origins  of  the  proposal,  we  hope  to  convey  the  message  that 
negative interest rates are not the ‘idée fixe’ of a monetary crank, but a serious policy proposal 
and that the issue should be further examined. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section two depicts the historical origins 
of negative interest rates and their reception up until the end of the 20
th century. Section three 
reviews the existing literature on the negative interest rates as a means for removing the zero 
bound.  Section  four  elaborates on  the  so  far overlooked  efficiency  enhancing  property  of 
negative  interest  rates  in  monetary  search-models  and  connects  the  two  existing  modern 
strands of the literature. The last section examines the practical implications of taxing money 
and concludes.  
Silvio Gesell and free money 
It is commonly recognized that the idea of a tax on money was first proposed by Silivo 
Gesell, a successful businessman, autodidactic economist, and prominent social reformer. He 
proposed a libertarian economic theory and political economy that aimed at creating a truly 
competitive  market  that  would  ensure  the  just  distribution  of  income.  Thus,  he  strongly 
refuted the Marxist economic theory and their proposed solution  of collective property as ‘the 
death of personal freedom’ (Gesell, 1958, p. 15), embracing the ‘Manchester System’ as the 
natural economic order he aimed to create, in which everyone would be remunerated with the 
full proceeds of his own labour (Gesell, 1958, pp. 11-12).  Gesell’s followers claim that he laid 
the foundations of a libertarian anarchist economic theory, which went beyond Marx’s call for 
collective property (Bartsch, 1989, pp. 29-31), and constitutes an independent ‘third way’ (Flik, 
2004, p. 124) for reconciling socialism with economic and personal freedom, ‘an alternative 
beyond  hitherto  realized  economic  systems’  (Onken,  2000,  p.  614).  In  addition,  Gesell 
developed  a  rather  colourful  social  utopia  which  combined  Darwinian  elements  with  the 
philosophies of Nietzsche and Stirner.
5 This mingling of economic theory, political ideas and 
social utopia made his reputation as an ‘anarchist prince’ (Preparata, 2002, p. 218). 
                                                           
5 For a concise introduction to Gesell’s utopia of an ‘akratic’ society see Bartsch (1989, pp. 24-31).  
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Gesell begun his autodidactic reflections on the monetary system instigated by the on-
going economic and social crisis in 19
th century Argentina, where he had opened his own 
business after his emigration in 1887.
6 In his debut treatise, Die Reformation im Münzwesen als 
Brücke zum Sozialen Staat, Gesell (1891, pp. 51-55) presents his main concept of negative 
interest rates on ready money, which he later named Freigeld (free money). Concerning the 
practical implementation of negative interest rates, Gesell advocated that in order to remain 
legal tender, a stamp worth a thousandth of the note’s face value had to be attached to it once 
a week, amounting to an annual depreciation rate of approximately 5 % (Gesell, 1958, pp. 266-
276). It is this proposal of taxing money that is commonly referred to by authors working on 
the subject as Gesell’s main contribution to economic theory.  
However, Gesell not only invented the instrument, in his main work, The Natural Economic 
Order (Gesell, 1958), he also offers an economic theory that justifies and explains his call for 
taxing money. In fact, some scholars of the history of economic thought have argued that 
Gesell importance for economic thinking is not to be found in his invention of the policy 
instrument, but rather in his radical theory of interest which appears as a direct predecessor to 
Keynes’s deliberations on interest as a monetary phenomenon. In his doctoral dissertation in 
1940  and  two  subsequent  articles  in  1942,  Dudley  Dillard  was  the  first  economist  to 
demonstrate the close kinship between the monetary theories of the famous French anarchist 
Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes,
7 and this conclusion was independently upheld by various other 
authors working on the subject.
8 The striking theoretical similarities are further evidence in 
support of the Post Keynesian claim that the General Theory’s main theoretical innovation – a 
monetary  theory  of  interest  –  has  been  completely  ignored  by  mainstream  economists 
(Ilgmann, 2009).
9   
                                                           
6 See Werner (1990) and Onken (1999) for overviews on Silvio Gesell’ life and work. Ilgmann (2009) offers a short 
discussion on Gesell’s place in the History of Thought.  
7 Dullard established striking theoretical similarities between Keynes, Gesell and the Proudhon (Dillard, 1942b, pp. 
75-76), with Gesell ‘primarily interesting as the link between the other two’ (Dillard, *1940+ 1997, p. 6). In a further 
article on Keynes’ political economy, Dillard (1946, p. 149) argued that ‘Keynes’ judgement of the relative merits of 
Marx and Gesell, *...+, would seem to reveal much more about Keynes than it does about either Marx or Gesell’ and 
in  his  book  on  Keynes,  Dillard  (1948,  pp.  322-323)  maintained  that  studying  Gesell  indeed  furthers  the 
understanding of Keynes’s theoretical innovations. 
8 See also Michael Herland (1977) and Jérôme Blanc (1998; 2002). The most radical view is put forward by Guido 
Preparata (2002) who accuses Keynes of plagiarism of Gesell’s idea of a monetary rate of interest. Darity (1995) 
comments on the similarities in their political economy. 
9 This interpretation of the General Theory is suggested in Ilgmann (2009) and is akin with the Post Keynesian 
interpretation. It is supported by various statements made in defense of the General Theory, e. g. Keynes (1937a, p. 
216): ‘The rate of interest obviously measures *...+ the premium which has to be offered to induce people to hold 
their wealth in some other form than hoarded money.’ He also defended his view in an article in The Economic 
Journal where he stated ‘*…+ the rate of interest is that rate at which the demand and supply of liquid resources are 
balanced. Saving does not come into the picture at all (Keynes, 1937b, p. 668). Keynes (& Robertson, 1938, pp. 318-
319): ‘Now that we have got away from the idea of the rate of interest being depended on saving and have reached  
6 
 
A complete analysis of Gesell’s theory is beyond the scope of this article; nevertheless 
because Gesell’s economic theory has rarely been discussed in the literature, in the following 
we will attempt a brief sketch of his reasoning.
10  Gesell’s starting point is that holding money 
does not involve carrying charges. Goods on the other hand are subject to natural decay and 
thus holding them incurs considerable costs. Therefore, money holders may withhold their 
money  from  circulation  while  those  possessing  goods,  producers  and  merchants,  cannot. 
Gesell now assumes that this difference in the quality between money and goods leads to 
strategic behaviour on the part of the money holders. They might withhold from buying, thus 
leaving the suppliers of goods with the losses caused by natural decay. Therefore the latter are 
willing to pay a ‘bribe’ (in Gesell’s terminology) to the money holders in order to avoid the 
depreciation on their goods and products. This is the source of ‘basic’ interested, unearned 
income due to the different physical properties of money and goods.
11 This is the kernel of his 
theory: interest as a pure monetary phenomenon due to its negligible carrying charges.  
Moreover, this micro analysis holds serious implications for Gesell’s macro model, which is 
founded on the Quantity Theory. According to Gesell, production, which is constant in the 
short run, determines aggregate supply, while the amount of money divided by the price level 
times velocity of circulation constitutes aggregate demand. Thus, supply is given by exogenous, 
in the short run constant factors, while the velocity of circulation depends on the strategic 
behaviour of the money holders.  They will  only  bring  their  money  into  circulation  if  they 
receive a profit margin – basic interest. Therefore, while aggregate supply is determined by the 
stock of goods, aggregate demand is subject to fluctuations and may therefore differ from 
supply. Gesell thus rejects Say’s law that each supply creates its own demand (see also Dillard, 
*1940+ 1997, p. 161). Consequently, in Gesell’s model, aggregate supply and demand are only 
in equilibrium, if the supply side is able to generate a profit margin above the production costs 
that allows them to pay basic interest.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
the idea  of  its being in  some sense a  monetary  phenomenon, the remaining  difference of  opinion cannot be 
fundamental  and  agreement  should  be  within  reach.’  Several  Post  Keynesian  authors  have  underlined  their 
interpretation of Keynes by referring to Keynes’ praise for Gesell. See, for example, Argitis (2008, pp. 251-253), 
Davidson (2000, p. 49), and Cowen and Krozner (1994, pp. 387-388). 
10 The following paragraph draws on the interpretation of Gesell and Keynes’ embracing comments as suggested by 
Ilgmann (2009).  
11 Gesell assumed that ‘basic’ interest had been between four and five percent throughout the ages, denying that 
the competition between money lenders would drive the rate of interest down. The only limits to the monetary 
determined rate of interest were the amount of money that needed to circulate for the essential needs of everyday 
life, such as food, as well the competition of barter once money interest rates become prohibitively high. It must be 
noted, however, that Gesell acknowledged that interest rates contain risk and inflation premiums (Gesell, 1958, pp. 
431-436), but he maintained that these would only be slightly above zero after the introduction of negative interest 
rates. Risk premium, understood as the marginal costs of lending, will be low, because most savers will invest their 
money in life insurance, which, in turn, will invest in real assets that act as securities (Gesell, 1958, pp. 407-408).  
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This  reasoning  of  Gesell  is  somewhat  confusing  to  a  modern  economist.  Basically,  he 
assumes that basic interest is added to the production costs of a product, which corresponds 
to the cost of capital in modern accounting. However, he argues that real capital only offers a 
positive yield because it is scarce and it is kept scare because of the existence of basic interest. 
Because  the  productivity  of  real  capital  must  equal  at  the  margin  the  monetary  rate  of 
interest, the capital stock, which would normally expand until the marginal efficiency of real 
capital would become zero, falls always short of demand because any growth that would push 
down capital’s marginal efficiency below the monetarily determined basic rate is impossible. 
This inclusion of capital costs in the production costs of goods is what he assumes to be the 
‘transfer of basic interest to the wares’ (Gesell, 1958, pp. 387-389). 
Based on these insights, Gesell explained the occurrence of economic crises.
12 Effective 
demand as determined by money supply is  only available  in the absence of deflation and 
deflationary  expectations  respectively.
13  As  the  capital  stock,  including  the  amount  of 
commodities, rises, prices begin to fall, lowering marginal capital productivity and, because 
deflation raises the real interest earned o n money, while lowering it on real cap ital assets, 
disinvestment takes place, reducing general output. Moreover, in such a situation people will 
find it increasingly difficult to service their liabilities.   This  notion  is nothing less than a 
description of a deflationary spiral in the spirit of Irving Fisher, in which, once deflation sets in, 
effective  demand  decreases,  which  in  turn  further  depresses  prices.  If  the  monetary 
authorities now increase the amount of money in order  to increase demand and to offset 
deflation, the additional money will simply be hoarded.
14 The system will only be restored to 
equilibrium when capital endowment and hence output have fallen to such an extent that the 
marginal productivity of capital equals once again basic interest.  
Given this analysis, Gesell’s cure for economic crises is therefore to subject money to 
natural decay via taxation, thereby restoring the validity of the Quantity Theory and Say’s Law. 
With depreciative fiat currency, money involves carrying charges, and those possessing it are 
no longer able to hoard, which in turn would render the velocity of circulation and effective 
demand constant.  This enables the authorities to ensure price stability by steering the amount 
                                                           
12 As (Dillard, *1940+ 1997, p. 171) pointed out, Gesell ‘offers no separate theory of crisis’. Rather, he explains 
disequilibria through the nature of interest. 
13 ‘When confidence exists, there is money in the market; when confidence is wanting, money withdraws – such is 
the teaching of experience’ (Gesell, 1958, p. 260).  
14 ‘Supply therefore becomes larger and more urgent, because demand hesitates, and demand hesitates simply 
because supply is too large in proportion to demand’ (Gesell, 1958, p. 232). ‘This therefore, is the law of demand, 
that it disappears when it becomes insufficient’ (Gesell, 1958, p. 235 *bold type in the original+).  
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of money in circulation by means of an independent monetary policy
15.  In addition, interest 
and the power of the rentier would disappear while the capital stock would expand until its 
marginal efficiency is zero, raising output and employment. This is – in a nutshell – the essence 
of  Gesell  economic  theory,  which  constitutes  the  foundation  of  an  independent  anarchist 
economic theory (Bartsch, 1989, pp. 20-30).  
Given the seemingly simple solution offered by Gesell, it is no wonder that his proposal of 
taxing money has received recognition mainly in times of crisis, probably most prominently 
during  the  interwar  period,
16  when Gesell briefly became the Minister of Finance in the 
Bavarian  Soviet  Republic.  During  the  same  period,  his  policy  proposal  and  theoretical 
reasoning was also taken up by Irving Fischer (1933) and J. M. Keynes (1936). Fisher on the one 
hand promoted negative interest rates in his book on stamp scrip, but remained overly 
sceptical of Gesell’s theory: ‘There is much in Gesell's philosophy to which, as an economist, I 
cannot subscribe, especially his theory of interest; but Stamp Scrip, I believe, can, in the 
present emergency, be made at least as useful an invention as Manuel Garcia's [a singer] 
laryngoscope’ (Fisher, 1933, pp. 17 *our emphasis+).  
During  the  Great  Depression,  Fisher  was  labelled  ‘the  patron  saint  of the  stamp  scrip 
movement’ in the United States by one commentator (Reeve, 1943, 165) and his assistant, 
Hans  R.  L.  Cohrssen,  a  committed  free-economist,  counted  approximately  450  U.S. 
municipalities that wanted to issue stamp script. Moreover, in 1932 there was a short-lived 
legislative  initiative  (Bankhead-Pettengill  Bill)  which  asked  for  the  creation  of  one  billion 
Dollars of stamp script in order to finance labour intensive public works. For the same reason, 
the state of Oregon planned to issue 80 million Dollars in stamp script in 1933, but the plan 
was stopped by the Treasury, who was willing to accept stamp script on a local level, but did 
not endorse general monetary reform (Cohrssen, 1991, p. 5; see also Gatch, 2006,  p. 19). 
Moreover, most local currencies were designed as ‘self-liquidating’, meaning that a note was 
meant to circulate until it accumulated sufficient stamps to redeem the note at face value 
against dollars. Therefore, the bills were stamped per transaction and not per period of time, 
as Gesell and Fisher had suggested which amounted to an additional sales tax. Worse, in order 
to increase its acceptance, sponsors of the plan pledged to deposit an equivalent amount of 
                                                           
15  Gesell's  matter  of  concern  was  the  achievement  of  price  stability  in  an  environment  where  money  keeps 
circulating steadily and interest rates are low. His periodic tax on money was meant to disincentivate the hoarding 
of money without recurring to high interest rates or positive inflation rates. Therefore, it is not comprehensible that 
Gesell was labelled an ‘inflationist’ by Ludwig von Mises (1952), F.A. Hayek (1976) and other Austrian economists. 
16 Gesell was comparatively well-known pre-World War II, as is shown by Dillard’s (1942a, p. 348) list of works 
referring to Gesell and by his appearance in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Garvy, 1975, p. 392).   
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Dollars in escrow in order to ensure redemption, a measure practically nullifying the inflating 
effect  of  the  additional  currency.  Thus,  the  majority  of  local  currencies  during  the  Great 
Depression  neither  served  Fisher’s  or  Gesell’s  goals,  as  only  a  handful  of  municipalities 
introduced time based script (Gatch, 2006, pp. 27-29; see also Warner, 2010) 
Keynes (1936, p. 353) on the other hand praised Gesell’s ‘flashes of deep insight’ because 
he defined interest as ‘being in some sense a monetary phenomenon’ Keynes (& Robertson, 
1938, pp. 318-319) caused by  money’s superior liquidity premium, but dismissed negative 
interest as ‘not feasible in the form in which he [Gesell] proposed it‘ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 356-
357).  Followers  of  Gesell  have  typically  taken  this  as  an  implicit  acceptance  of  the  latter 
theoretical stance and tend to ignore that Keynes (1936, p. 356) also stated that ‘there is a 
great defect in Gesell’s theory’ because ‘the notion of liquidity-preference had escaped him’. 
Indeed, Keynes called Gesell’s theory only ‘half a theory of interest’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 356) 
because  in  his  opinion  Gesell  failed  to  understand  the  role  of  uncertainty  in  determining 
liquidity preference and hence the rate of interest. Nevertheless, these embracing remarks 
shed new light on the extent of Keynes’ attack on the classics, which he accused of having 
failed to develop an adequate theory of interest.
17 Keynes thus did not embrace negative 
interest as such, but the underlying idea of interest as a monetary phenomenon (Ilgmann, 
2009). Indeed, Pigou (1936, p. 124) saw the implication of Keynes appraisal of Gesell clearly: 
‘For example, on p. 355, he seems to agree with Gesell that "the rate of interest is a purely 
monetary  phenomenon."  If  this  were  in  fact  his  view,  Mr.  Keynes'  divorce  from  classical 
thought would be complete.’  
Summing up the afore said, Gesell theory rest entirely on the different carrying charges of 
money and goods and from today’s perspective appears rather naive. It seems rather unlikely 
that  taxing  money  would  cure  the  ills  of  modern  day  capitalism  as  his  supporters  claim. 
Nevertheless, in retrospect Gesell has remarkable achievements as an autodidactic scholar. He 
advocated modern  fiat money,  even  before  World  War  One,  at  a  time  when  the  ‘golden 
fetters’ were firmly in place and his idea of price stability as the sole target of monetary policy 
is not far away from what most central banks nowadays strive for (Huth 2005). Moreover, he 
advanced the notion of interest as a purely monetary phenomenon even before Keynes, a 
remarkable deed that is often obscured by the fact that the extent of Keynes’ attack on his 
‘fellow economists’ has largely been underestimated. Finally, as Irving Fisher said, he invented 
                                                           
17  ‘Now I  range myself  with the heretics.  I  believe their flair and their instinct move them  towards the right 
conclusion. *….+ There is, I am convinced, a fatal flaw in that part of orthodox reasoning *…+ due to the failure of the 
classical doctrine to develop a satisfactory and realistic theory of interest’ (Keynes, 1935, p. 36).  
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an instrument, albeit by accident, that could prove to be a valuable additional monetary policy 
tool. 
Removing the zero bound 
Whatever the merits of Gesell as economist are, during the period of relative stability 
following  the  Second  World  War,  his  idea  of  negative  nominal  interest  rates  was  quickly 
forgotten. Interest in Gesell’s proposal was only renewed through the Japanese experience 
when  the  country  faced  a  liquidity  trap  like  situation  during  the  1990s,  which  rendered 
monetary policy useless in fighting deflation and recession.
18 For this to happen, the existence 
of a lower (zero)
19 bound is a necessary condition (Ewans, Guse & Honkapohja, 2007, p. 1438) 
and since then, the implications of the zero bound and possible remedies were discussed yet 
again (see Buiter, 2005b, Yates, 2004, and Ullersma, 2002, for reviews on the relevant 
literature). However, before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the case of Japan remained 
somewhat a curiosum since the majority of developed countries enjoyed a period of stable 
growth in the last twenty years,
20  and previous to the current crisis, the risk of hitting the zero 
floor to rates was considered to be very small, with the case of Japan being looked at as a rare 
exception (Yates, 2004, p. 428; Ullersma, 2002, p. 293).
21   
Thus, it is safe to say the zero lower bound was considered a ‘ghost’ from the past (Buiter, 
2005b) in mainstream economics, in particular in the light of high inflation rates in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Ullersma, 2002, pp. 273-277). Some authors nevertheless took up Gesell’s proposal 
of a tax on money as a means of overcoming the zero bound on interest rates, as for example, 
in  Goodfriend  (2000),  Buiter  and  Panigirtzoglou  (1999;  2003),  Fukao  (2005)  and  Buiter 
(2005a,b; 2007; 2010). It was only the current crisis with central bank rates close to zero and 
                                                           
18 Krugman (1998), in his seminal work, argued that Japan faced a liquidity trap like situation at that time. We use 
the term in the sense of Krugman (1998, p. 137), who defines it as ‘that awkward condition in which monetary 
policy loses its grip because the nominal interest rate is essentially zero, in which the quantity of money becomes 
irrelevant because money and bonds are essentially perfect substitutes’. A deflationary spiral is described as a 
situation, ‘where inflation and expected inflation fall, nominal interest rates at some point come up against the zero 
bound, real interest rates rise, aggregate demand and expected inflation fall even further, real rates rise by yet 
more, and so on’ (Yates, 2004, p. 427).   
19 Benhabib et al. (2000b, pp. 26-27) have rightfully pointed out that for a liquidity trap to persist, the existence of 
some lower bound is a sufficient condition, given that the central bank conducts a Taylor-type monetary policy. 
20 ‘One of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years or so has been a 
substantial  decline  in  macroeconomic  volatility.  [....]  Similar  declines  in  the  volatility  of  output  and  inflation 
occurred at about the same time in other major industrial countries, with the recent exception of Japan, a country 
that has faced a distinctive set of economic problems in the past decade’ (Bernanke, 2004). 
21 Some authors even questioned whether liquidity traps had developed at all during the Great Depression (Bordo 
& Filardo, 2005, p. 817), although the latter is widely held as the textbook case (Ullersma, 2002, p. 276).   
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stagnating growth rates in many (western) economies which raised the awareness of a wider 
audience for the possibility of negative interest rates.
22 
The problem 
The zero bound argument refers to the implicit zero interest on coin and currency as a risk 
free  instrument  which  forms  the  larger  part  of  the  monetary  base,  the  remainder  being 
commercial bank reserves with the central bank. Since base money constitutes the most liquid 
form of assets, a rational economic agent will not hold any other type of asset unless it earns a 
higher return than base money (Buiter and Panigirtzoglou, 2003, p. 727). As long as the two 
components of the monetary base are perfect substitutes concerning the provision of liquidity, 
any deviation of their interest rates would cause the demand for the other to become infinite. 
Thus, any attempt to levy negative interest rates must necessarily involve the whole monetary 
base.  
The zero bound exists because coins and currencies are bearer instruments as opposed to 
registered instruments such as bank accounts (Buiter, 2010, p. 214). In fact, levying a tax on 
commercial  bank  reserves  and  any  form  of  registered  account  in  order  to  make  implicit 
interest on these assets negative would be as trivial as collecting positive interest (Buiter & 
Panigirtzoglou,  2003,  p.  730).  However,  this  cannot  be  done  with  coins  and  bank  notes, 
because  these  are  anonymous  bearer  bonds  and  their  transfer  is  not  registered  but  by 
delivery. Inducing the anonymous holders of coins and bills to pay the interest due is rather 
difficult since they lack the incentive to do so. Given the existence of coin and currency with a 
zero nominal interest rate, any attempt to levy negative interest on registered accounts above 
the carry and storage costs of currency would cause substitution of the former by the latter. 
Therefore, given the current form of paper money, the zero bound sets a limit to the 
domain over which the nominal interest rate can be set. This in turn sets a floor to market 
rates at the zero nominal interest rates of coin and currency. However, in reality this floor to 
market rates is a lot higher since the latter contain risk premium and administrative costs.
23 
Once base rates are close to zero, conventional monetary policy is ineffective for reducing 
market interest rates any further. If one seeks to fully remove the zero bound, levying negative 
interest rates on the whole monetary base becomes inevitable, and  because bank notes are 
                                                           
22 At the time of writing (October 2010) the Federal Funds target rate is still between 0 and 0.25 per cent, the Bank 
of Japans target rate is at 0.1 per cent, the Bank of England’s Rate is 0.5 per cent and the ECB main refinancing 
operation is 1 per cent.  
23 van Suntum et al. (2010) propose long-term central bank lending as way for reducing the floor to market rates 
against zero.   
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bearer bonds with anonymous owners, paying the interest due would have to take place on 
the bills themselves. 
The Proposals  
Scholars have come up with various schemes for removing the zero bound via negative 
interest rates. Buiter (2010) proposes three different methods for removing the zero bound.
  
One very interesting proposal is separating the means of payment function of currency and its 
unit of account role, was already suggested by Einaudi (1953) and Gaitskell (1969). Buiter 
(2005a) refers to Eisler (1932), who distinguished between the function as “unit of account” on 
the one hand and as a “medium of exchange” as well as “store of value” on the other hand. 
Eisler himself was rather not concerned about the implications of the zero bound, but his 
motivation was to shield the economy from the negative effects of inflation. Nevertheless, in 
the recent literature Eisler’s proposal is taken up as a method for removing the zero bound by 
separating the means of payment function of currency and its unit of account role (Boyle, 
2002, Davies, 2004, and Buiter, 2005a; 2010). 
According  to  Buiter’s  (2005a;  2010)  scheme,  the  existing  currency  is  withdrawn  and 
replaced by a new government-issued currency. This new currency only serves as legal tender 
and cannot be used to denominate prices of commodities and hence all prices, wages and 
contracts are denominated in a different unit of account. Since there are no coins or notes of 
the currency that serves as the unit of account, the monetary authorities may set a negative 
rate of interest on all registered accounts in the manner described above. In order to avoid a 
flight into the legal tender, it is constantly depreciated against the currency which serves as a 
unit of account. Covered interest parity demands that the rate of depreciation of the legal 
tender must equal the negative interest rate on the unit of account (Buiter, 2010, p. 230). 
Thus, the whole monetary base is subject to negative interest rates, although the nominal 
interest rates on coins and bank notes respectively remain zero. Indeed, Eisler-like schemes 
have been adopted in Latin America to fight inflation, most notably in Chile, but so far have not 
been used as a method for removing the zero bound.   
Nonetheless, the most commonly thought method for removing the zero bound is taxing 
money. To begin with, the easiest way to implement such a scheme was to abolish coin and 
bank  notes  altogether.  Buiter  (2010,  pp.  222-226)  considers  coins  and  bank  notes  to  be 
redundant media of exchange, the larger part of it being held abroad for legitimate (store of 
value in countries with high inflation rates) and illegitimate (underground economy) reasons. 
In developed countries, its function of providing liquidity could easily be satisfied by bank  
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accounts. Roughly half of Dollar and Euro notes are held abroad and of the remainder only a 
small fraction is held for transaction purposes.
24 As stated above, without coins and currency, 
levying the tax on all non -bearer bonds  is technically simple. .  . If coins and currency are 
completely replaced by electronic transfers via registered accounts, in theory there is no limit 
to the domain over which the rate of interest can be set.  In addition, there would be the 
additional advantage of hitting the underground   economy as the absence of anonymous 
bearer bonds would make all economic transactions traceable.  
Although abolishing coins and currency offers a seemingly simple solution to the zero 
bound and Buiter’s argument about the redundancy of coins and notes is not easily refuted, 
there are various problems associated with this scheme. Buiter (2010, pp. 223-224) states the 
usefulness of currency as a means for payment and store of value for low-income households 
is a standard argument for keeping coins and currency. However, given that the majority of 
currency  by  value  is  held  in  large  denominations  which  are  hardly  used  for  transaction 
purposes, he believes that the real reason behind the continued existence is the substantial 
seigniorage through the issuance of non-interest bearing and non-redeemable legal tender. 
We believe that there are more good reasons for keeping coins and currency. First, having a 
redundant  system  of  payment  besides  complex  electronic  devices  might  be  an  additional 
backup in case that the sophisticated electronic system fails. Indeed, blackouts and computer 
bugs have in the past disturbed electronic payment systems and with cyber warfare becoming 
increasingly sophisticated, having a redundant medium of exchange might even become a 
question of national security.  Second, with all transactions being done by registered accounts, 
all economic activity of the population becomes traceable. While this has potential benefits 
concerning the fight on crime, it will also raise the question of potential abuse and hence of 
adequate data protection. Finally, there is also a psychological factor, because people might 
not accept non-physical money, in particular in times of a crisis. 
Thus, if one wishes to keep coins and currency as media of exchange, negative interest 
rates  could  never  exceed  the  (storage)  carrying  charges  of  ready  money;  otherwise  the 
demand for the latter would become indefinite. In the case of a sharp deflation, it might be 
insufficient to lower real interest only by the margin given by the carrying costs (Buiter, 2005b, 
p. 14). Therefore, if one seeks to fully remove the zero bound, taxing non-electronic money is 
inevitable. Because bank notes are bearer bonds with anonymous owners, taxing would have 
to take place on the bills themselves (Goodfriend, 2000, p. 1015, deems taxing coins to be 
                                                           
24 Buiter (2010, p. 223) concludes therefore that ‘the only domestic beneficiaries from the existence of anonymity-
providing currency are the underground economy’.  
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unnecessary, since storing great quantities of small change would incur high costs).  As we 
discussed above, Gesell advocated stamping ready money as a practical means of removing 
the  zero  bound.    With  modern  technology,  using  stamps  could  be  replaced  by  electronic 
devices  (Goodfriend,  2000,  pp.  1016-1017).  With  both  components  of  the  monetary  base 
subject to this tax, simple arbitrage would ensure that all other components of the money 
supply will also yield negative nominal interest.  
Model based evaluation 
The modern treatment of negative nominal interest rates has not made halt at the verbal 
analysis  of  the  zero  bound  problem  and  proposals  how  to  overcome  it,  but  constructed 
technical models to assess the effectiveness of negative interest rates to escape from liquidity 
traps. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) build a continuous time representative agent model 
where money is held despite of the existence of riskless bonds with positive yields because 
money holdings generate direct utility. They consider two versions: In the flexible price version 
of this Money-in-the-Utility-Function (MIU) model the Pareto-efficient monetary policy is the 
so-called Friedman rule where agents are satiated with money and the interest rate on bonds 
equals the interest on currency, i=iM. In the absence of policy measures to overcome the zero-
bound on nominal interest rates this interest rate of currency, iM, is zero, the Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium coincides with the liquidity trap equilibrium. The only problem with the liquidity 
trap is that the lower bound on interest rates might prevent the economy to achieve the 
inflation target. By setting the interest rate on currency sufficiently negative, however, any 
inflation target can be achieved.  
The more interesting case is the Keynesian version, where output is demand-determined 
and  inflation  adjusts  to  the  gap  between  actual  and  potential  output  through  an 
accelerationist  Phillips  curve.  The  dynamics  of  the  economic  system  are  determined  by  a 
system  of  2  first-order  differential  equation  in  inflation  and  consumption,  the  latter  one 
switching when the interest rate reaches its lower bound.  The 2-dimensional phase diagram 
shows a saddle-point stable steady-state in the non-binding “normal” case (i> iM ) and a centre 
surrounded by closed integral curves in the binding “liquidity trap” case (i=iM). The authors 
then show that there exists demand or supply shocks that can lead the economy from the 
“normal” saddle-point steady state to the liquidity trap equilibrium. A negative interest rate on 
currency shifts the liquidity trap steady state and the boundary between the two regimes to 
the left such that an economy caught in the liquidity trap can escape to the normal regime 
with sufficiently negative interest rates on currency. Moreover, since negative interest rates on  
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currency widen the distance between the two steady states the likelihood to end up in a 
liquidity trap is reduced as well.  
These findings are upheld by Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Buiter (2010) in New-
Keynesian discrete time MIU models with price setting a la Calvo-Woodford (Calvo, 1983; 
Woodford, 2003) and forward looking Phillips-Curves. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) study 
the effects of a Gesell tax in the model of Benhabib et al. (2001). In that framework  the lower 
bound on nominal interest rates becomes binding under sufficiently large negative shocks and 
the  economy  enters  a  liquidity  trap  and  can  end  in  a  deflationary  spiral.  Buiter  and 
Panigirtzoglou (2003)  then show that the liquidity trap region can be completely eliminated by 
setting the Gesell tax such that the interest rate on currency iM keeps a constant distance d to 
the short-term interest rate i on non-monetary assets, that means iM  = i –d, where d≥0, and i is 
determined by the Taylor rule. They also note that setting d to zero would correspond to the 
Friedman rule, that aims at eliminating the opportunity cost of holding money, and that this 
policy would still eliminate the liquidity trap. The same holds true in the model of Buiter 
(2010), where the author stresses that a Gesell tax would allow the authorities to target true 
price stability (zero inflation) without fear of hitting the lower bound on interest rates.  
The common feature of these model based studies of the Gesell tax and negative interest 
rates is the focus on overcoming the zero bound and the corresponding liquidity trap and – 
apart from the ad-hoc model of Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) -   the use of Walrasian DSGE 
models. However, in all of these models, money has no essential role and is held only because 
it enters the utility function directly. Hence, these studies do not address important issues like 
the effects of Gesell taxes on efficiency of exchange or on the velocity of money. Moreover, as 
has been stated by Wallace (1998) the Friedman rule is efficient in all models where money is 
not essential, but there exist many models where money is essential and the Friedman rule 
ceases to be optimal. .This leads us to con-sider the efficiency effects of Gesell taxes in a model 
class with essential money in more detail. 
Efficiency of monetary exchange 
Independently  of  Gesell’s  ideas  and  the  debate  on  the  zero  bound,  a  tax  on  money 
appeared in the literature on search-theoretic models of money. First, it was meant to be a 
proxy for inflation in first-generation search models that could not study the effects of money 
growth and inflation directly. Second, it was found that there was an efficiency enhancing role 
of these money taxes in models where the endogenous choice of search-intensity leads to an  
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inefficient size of the ‘market’ due to externalities in the search for trading partners. When 
modelling advancements made the proxy role of money taxes obsolete, since inflation could 
now be studied directly, the efficiency enhancing role was attributed only to inflation, and the 
policy tool money taxes was not recognized as such. Since the reader is probably not very 
familiar with the search-theoretic literature
25, we expose in the following the main deviations 
from the Walrasian paradigm and review the discussions and results with respect to taxes on 
money in the different generations of search models. 
Monetary search models starting with Kiyotaki and Wright  (19 89, 1993) replace the 
centralized Walrasian goods market by decentralized bilateral exchange of different iated 
goods among agents with heterogeneous tastes over these goods. In this environment money 
can ease bilateral trade by overcoming the problem of an `absence of double coincidence of 
wants'. Without money, the producer of say good A that likes good B wo uld have to find a 
producer of good B that likes good A – a difficult task when there is a large number of different 
goods in the economy. A money holder, on the contrary, has just to search for a producer of 
the desired good that accepts money. The latter will only do so if he expects others to accept 
money  in  the  future  (in  exchange  for  their  products).  Thus,  if  money  is  accepted  across 
economy as the medium exchange, the resulting monetary equilibrium is characterized by a 
higher amount of transactions. Hence, money plays an essential role in the sense that some of 
the allocations achievable in a monetary equilibrium cannot be achieved in an equilibrium 
without money.
26  In terms of efficiency monetary equilibria improve on barter equilibria. 
    The literature distinguishes now three generations of search models of money, each of 
them dealing in a different way with the  high degree of heterogeneity of agents that arises 
through the pairwise exchange of goods which is generating non -degenerate distributions of 
goods inventories and money holdings.
27 The early search literature assumed indivisible money 
and indivisible goods such that an agent could hold only 1 unit of money or 1 unit of goods and 
trade took place at a constant price 1.  This simplified the analysis since the distribution of 
money was degenerate, each agent carrying either 0 or 1 units of money. A second generation 
of models based on Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) kept the simplifying assumption of 
                                                           
25 See for example Rupert et al. (2000, chapter 4) and Shi (2006) for an extensive overview over the literature 
based on the search-theoretic approach. 
26 Kocherlakota (1998) establishes that necessary conditions for the essentiality of money are the lack of complete 
memory  and  of  full  commitment  to  future  actions.  The  latter  follows  from  the  usual  assumption  of  random-
matching and rules out the use of credit, while the former inhibits the use of punishments to trigger gift-giving 
equilibria. See also Corbae, et.al. (2002) for models with directed search where money remains essential as long as 
agents are restricted to one bilateral trade per period. 
27 The use of simulation methods to keep track of these distributions is very cumbersome. See Molico (2006) and 
Molico and Zhang (2006).  
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indivisible  money  holdings,  but  endogenized  prices  by  allowing  for  divisible  quantities  of 
goods. Prices are determined in each match through Nash-Bargaining over the quantity of 
goods to be exchanged for one unit of money. Third generation search models abolish the 
restrictive  assumption  of  indivisible  money  and  allow  therefore  to  study  directly  positive 
money growth and inflation. There are basically two competing approaches: the first one to 
appear was the representative agent formulation in Shi (1997, 1998, 1999), who assumes that 
the  decision  making  unit  -  the  household  -  is  itself  a  continuum  of  agents  and,  hence, 
idiosyncratic risk is fully insured. In a symmetric equilibrium each household ends up with the 
same money and inventory holdings, capital stock and the same number of hired workers as 
the average firm. The alternative approach elaborates on models of alternating decentralized 
and centralized markets following Lagos and Wright (2005) and Arouba et al. (2006). 
    An  interesting  feature  of  these  search  models  is  that  the  exchange  process  can  be 
inefficiently low because of too little search effort of buyers. In the following we review the 
literature on the effects of a tax on money on search-intensity or the number of buyers in the 
market and hence on aggregate transactions, consumption and output in first and second 
generation search models. Finally, we summarize the results of a recent study of the macro-
economic effects of money taxes in a full-fledged business cycle model with capital formation.  
First generation search models with endogenous search intensity 
Li (1995) was the first to point out the externalities that can arise with endogenous search 
effort of buyers: Since search is costly, buyers compare their search costs with the private 
gains  from  search,  rather  than  considering  the  social  gains  and  costs  of  a  higher  search 
intensity. In sufficiently productive economies, there is a search externality that leads to a 
lower  aggregate  number  of  transactions  relative  to  the  social  optimum.  The  author  then 
proposes a tax on money to deal with this inefficiency. The welfare improving role for policies 
which tax money balances 'emanates directly from the ability of such policies to increase 
search efforts and the aggregate rate of transactions. That is, the search externality provides a 
role for government in subsidizing search activity through taxing ‘nonsearch’', (Li (1995, p. 
938)). This resembles Gesell's idea of taxing the hoarding of money to provide incentives for 
the spending or lending of money balances.
28 Li (1995) derives the welfare improving role of 
taxing money holdings in a first generation search model of money where goods and money 
                                                           





29 The tax on money is modelled as a random expropriation of a unit of 
money.
30 It is then also interpreted as a ‘proxy for inflation’, which is generally thought to have 
the same consequences as the money tax in this model: increase in the cost of holding money, 
crowding out of real commodities through seigniorage revenue and reduction of real money 
balances. Finally, the author conjectures the optimality of inflation in more general models 
that would allow for positive money growth rates. In a follow-up paper Li (1996) examines the 
efficiency properties of money taxes in an extension of the model that allows for the storage 
of unsold goods inventories and finds similar results. 
Second Generation Search Models with Bargaining over Prices 
The  modelling  advance  through  the  introduction  of  bargaining  over  quantities  allowed 
researchers to study prices, but since it was still impossible to study positive money growth in 
these models issues like inflation and money taxes did not play a role. A recent exception is the 
treatment of a second generation search model in the paper of Liu, Wang and Wright (2008) 
that reviews in a similar way as the present chapter the first and second generation search 
models, but with respect to the effect of inflation on search-intensity.
31 Since the model with 
bargaining has either no monetary equilibrium or generically a pair of equilibria – one with low 
prices  and  another  with  high  prices  –  the  result  that  money  taxes  can  increase  search-
intensity, velocity and sales depends on the type of the equilibrium and on parameter values. 
One can still find efficiency increasing effects of money taxes in some but not in all equilibria. 
Notably, in their treatment there is no mentioning of the tax on money as a policy proposal on 
its own or to engineer negative interest rates. Instead, they discuss money taxes only as a 
proxy for inflation. 
Third Generation Search Models with divisible money  
When extending their analysis to a third generation search model in the tradition of Lagos 
and  Wright  (2005),  Liu  et  al.  (2008)  focus  only  on  the  effects  of  inflation,  since  their 
environment now allows to study positive money growth rates directly. Therefore, it is no 
exaggeration to claim that the two different literatures on money taxes – (1) as a proxy for 
inflation and a means to overcome inefficiencies in the monetary exchange process and (2) the 
Gesell tax proposal to remove the zero bound to nominal interest rates – have been totally 
unconnected up to the present. A study on the effects of money taxes in a theoretical model in 
                                                           
29 See also Liu et al. (2008) as an excellent formal treatment of money taxes in the first generation model of Li 
(1995). 
30  Note  the  resemblance  to  the  proposal  of  Mankiw  (2009)  to  induce  a  carrying  cost  on  notes  through  the 
withdrawal of all notes of a special series or denomination. 
31 Moreover, Liu et. al (2008) provide also a formal treatment of money taxes in a second generation search model.  
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the spirit of Lagos and Wright (2005) has still to be undertaken.
32  Menner (2010) studies the 
long-run and short-run effects of a Gesell tax in a full-fledged monetary business cycle model 
with capital accumulation that builds on Shi (1998) and was developed in Menner (2006).  
Menner’s (2010) long-run analysis characterizes the dependence of the steady states of 
various macroeconomic variables on the combination of money growth rates and Gesell taxes. 
The main finding is, first, that at moderate levels of inflation, a Gesell tax can increase the 
steady  state  levels  output  and  capital  and  has  positive  effects  on  search-intensity, 
consumption,  investment and  employment.  Second,  a  monetary equilibrium with  negative 
interest rates can only be achieved by a positive Gesell Tax. Third, the Friedman rule, i.e. that 
money growth rates should equal the discount factor, is feasible in the considered model only 
if accompanied by a Gesell tax, which has to be quite heavy to achieve efficiency.  
With respect to the short-run analysis, the focus is on the recovery path out of a recession 
under different policy scenarios. The recession is modelled as a sequence of negative shocks to 
time preference and investment efficiency that lower aggregate demand considerably, and 
hence leads to drops in output and employment  comparable to the last “great recession” 
period in the US. The baseline scenario without policy intervention is then compared to 3 
different  policy  scenarios:  (a)  a  Gesell  Tax  of  6%  (annualized)  on  money  holdings,  (b)  a 
monetary expansion made possible through negative interest rates implied by the application 
of the Gesell Tax of scenario (a), and (c) a government spending profile that mimics the current 
US stimulus program established in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA)
33.  The introduction of a Gesell tax shortens the period of recovery and brings back 
output  and employment to its steady state  level nearly  as early as the extraordinarily 
expensive fiscal stimulus program. It fosters private consumption and investment, while the 
government spending package has negative (crowding -out) effects on private consumption  
and investment. Adding a monetary expansion to the Gesell tax scenario as in scenario (b) has 
dampening effects on impact on all variables, such that the recession is not that profound and 
not that long-lasting, but in the medium and long run the economy  follows quite closely the 
economy of the pure Gesell tax scenario.  
Summarizing,  in  the  search -theoretic  business  cycle  model  of  Menner  (2010)  that 
overcomes the limitations of first and second generation search models a tax on money as 
                                                           
32 Note, however the various contributions to study the effects on inflation in these environments, e.g. Lagos-
Rocheteau(2005), Rocheteau-Wright (2005), Ennis (2008), Nosal (2008), Liu et. al (2008,2009). 




proposed initially by Gesell can have efficiency enhancing effects in the long run.  Moreover, 
besides allowing for negative interest rates and expansionary monetary policy in a demand 
driven recession, it can have a role on its own as a policy instrument to speed up velocity and 
foster aggregate demand by making people spend their money more rapidly.  
Practical considerations of Taxing Money 
Altering  the  existing  monetary  regime  is  always  controversial.  However,  from  a 
historical perspective, the world’s monetary system has been changing constantly. Although 
people tend to believe that the existing order is the only imaginable one, history teaches us 
that  the  institutional  design  of  money  is  subject  to  rapid  changes,  even  if  the  underlying 
purpose of facilitating exchange remains the idiosyncratic raison d'etre of money. For example, 
the last one hundred years saw the widespread advent of fiat money during the First World 
War, followed by a period of hyperinflation in many nations and a disastrous return to the gold 
standard that contributed to the worldwide spread of the Great Depression. After the Second 
World War, the Bretton Woods Dollar standard was the basis for the miraculous post war 
recovery, but run into trouble at the beginning of the 1970s. In fact, our modern monetary 
system of free floating fiat money is less than forty years old and is the outcome not of careful 
institutional design but rather of trial and error. Moreover, China and other nations are still 
pegging their currencies to the Dollar, thereby contributing to the gigantic trade imbalances of 
today. Thus, today’s monetary regime is neither a natural system nor a carefully designed one. 
It is rather the path dependent outcome of political and economic events, which should be 
altered if the incentive to do so is compelling. 
 
Cost and Benefits  
If negative interest rates thus have a theoretical foundation beyond its anarchistic origins 
and are technically feasible, this in turn raises questions about the potential costs and benefits 
of such a policy scheme, because besides some local currencies, negative interests are so far 
an untested policy tool, and hence it is difficult to quantify its effects. Nevertheless, in the 
following  we  will  attempt  to  sketch  the  possible  implications  of  negative  interest  rates 
independent of the concrete method of its implementation.  
To begin with the costs of such a scheme, Yates (2004, p. 445) argues  that negative interest 
rates  are  similar  to  raising  the  inflation  target,  the  costs  being  ‘the  shoe-leather  costs  of 
inflations in each case: *…+.’ This is not an argument against negative interest rates, at least in 
the case of a deflationary shock. Indeed, raising expected inflation and thereby reducing real  
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interest  rates  is  a  commonly  cited  policy  tool  once  the  zero  bound  is  hit.  For  example, 
Svensson (2001) devised a ‘foolproof way for escaping the zero bound’ by devaluating the 
exchange  rate,  thereby  stimulating  demand  and  inflation  respectively.  One  frequently 
proposed  alternative  to  avoid  a  binding  zero-bound  of  nominal  interest  rates  would  be a 
higher target rate of inflation that raises nominal interest rates through the ‘Fisher effect’ of 
higher  expected  inflation.  Jung  et  al.  (2005)  have  argued  that  central  banks  should  raise 
expected inflation by committing to a long term zero interest rate policy. However, while 
Svenssons’s  proposal  will,  in  case  of  worldwide  shock,  only  lead  to  beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies, the other proposal depends on the credibility of the central bank and must lead to 
inflation eventually.  
Moreover,  although    inflation  and Gesell  taxes  have  the  same  ‘shoe-leather costs’  and  
effects on search-activity, they make a big difference in terms of the working of the price 
mechanism: while Gesell taxes are consistent with a zero inflation target, i.e. they do not move 
the  price  level  so  that  movements  of  individual  prices  can  always  be  identified  as  such, 
inflation moves the price level and we have Lucas's (1973) signal extraction problem  where it 
is hard to distinguish movements of prices of individual goods and the aggregate price level. 
Zero  inflation  is  also  optimal  in  sticky  price  models,  since  it  reduces  the  need  for  price 
adjustments  and  eliminates  the  distortion  that  arises  through  price  dispersion
34. In these 
respects price stability  with Gesell taxes is preferable to moderate inflation. Moreover , it is 
probably easier to anchor expectations to a zero-inflation regime than to moderate inflation.   
Another frequently citied objection is that  providing the infrastructure for implementing 
negative interest rates will cause considerable costs and that such a policy theme has not been 
tested yet.  Thus, Yates  (2004, p. 446)   argued  there might be other more cost -effective 
methods for escaping the zero bound, such as quantitative or credit easing, and from a policy 
point of view, it might be wiser to use more thoroughly tried and tested methods. Admittedly, 
implementing negative interest rates will come at some costs but so does any policy scheme 
that tries to remove the zero bound.
35 Concerning the argument the negative interest rates are 
untested: The possible side effects of the current enormous quantitative and qualitative easing 
are equally  unpredictable. On the contrary, not long ago the purchase of ailing securities, e. g. 
treasury bonds, by central banks was considered to be a capital sin. At the same time the 
                                                           
34 See Woodford (2003) as an example of a large literature on optimal monetary policy with this view. 




effectiveness of this ‘innovative’ monetary policy remains doubtful, given stagnating growth 
rates the in the United States and elsewhere.  
Concerning  the  benefits,  the  search-theoretical  literature  proposes  a  negative  tax  on 
money to be efficiency enhancing.  A “hot potato” effect similar to the one caused by inflation 
increases velocity through higher search-effort of buyers trying to avoid the loss in value of 
their  money  balances.  This  results  in  a  higher  sum  of  overall  transactions  and  increases 
aggregate activity. Moreover, it is undisputable that one of the benefits of negative interest 
rates would be that of avoiding the floor to rates in the case of a sharp deflationary shock. 
Thus, the argument concerning the cost-benefit ratio depends partly on the probability and 
the scale of a deflationary spiral. While this risk was previously considered to very small indeed 
(Yates, 2004, p. 464), the recent developments have reminded practitioners and economist 
alike that the likelihood of such an event is not that small after all. If unconventional monetary 
policy is not able to offset the asymmetry in the domain over which the official policy rate can 
be set in the event of large deflationary shock, the cost of the zero bound may be vast indeed 
(Buiter, 2010, p. 236). A Gesell tax combined with a low inflation target however can avoid the 
distortions of considerable inflation and can be used to escape from a liquidity trap while a 
higher inflation target cannot achieve this goal. Therefore, negative interest rates offer an 
additional short-term policy option in the event of a large deflationary shock, if even such a 
scheme may come with some costs.  
Limitations 
Obviously , the range over which negative rates could be set is not unlimited, as Buiter 
(2007, p. 129) points out: ‘It goes without saying that for something to serve as a medium of 
exchange and means of payment, it will have to be willingly held between transactions and 
therefore will have to be a store of value.’ In Buiter’s view the storage of value complements 
money in its primary function as medium. On the first sight this contrasts Gesell’s argument 
that the two functions of money are dichotomous. However, this disagreement might be just a 
matter of degree or of definition. What Gesell has in mind is the ‘joker’ position of money as 
an unerodable store of value that inflicts on its role as means of exchange. If the value of 
money does not erode too much it will very likely be accepted, as the experience of low-and 
medium inflation periods shows. In a search theoretical paper, Cuadras-Morató (1997, p. 120) 
showed that even a perishable good could serve as money because ‘what determines which 
good appears as a medium of exchange are the extrinsic beliefs of agents about acceptability 
of goods, more than the intrinsic qualities of goods’.    
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In reality, there will be definitely a limit to the rate of depreciation that will be accepted by 
the public before the official currency will lose its status as commonly accepted medium of 
exchange.  Setting a very high rate of depreciation may lead to a substitution of the official 
currency by other means of payment, as it is usually the case during periods of high inflation. 
Hence, too negative interest rates may risk the status of the official fiat currency as commonly 
accepted legal means of payment. These considerations Gesell had already in mind when he 
proposed  a  5%  annualized  rate  of  depreciation  that  should  just  contrast  the  storage  cost 
advantage of money against other goods and should not go further than that rate. The same 
line of arguments may also explain to some extent the failure of some experiments of the 
stamp scrip movement in the US in the 30’s that tried a too high tax rate on money.   
Finally, a comment on the long-run implications of a Gesell tax is in order.  It is very unlikely 
that the imposition of Gesell taxes can lower real interest rates substantially in the long run, 
and that ‘capital rents’ finally disappear because of the elimination of basic interest - ‘Urzins’ 
as Gesell claims. According to the classical and neoclassical view, the long-run real interest rate 
is determined by thrift and productivity, i.e. by the levels of saving and investment and cannot 
be affected by monetary reform. For Austrians the interest rate is determined psychologically 
by  the  rate of  time  preference. Keynes’  liquidity  preference  theory,  however,  shares  with 
Gesell’s theory that the interest rate is a monetary phenomenon: according to Gesell interest 
rates are high because of the low storage cost of money, while according to Keynes (1936, 
Ch.17)  what  matters  is  that  money  has  among  all  assets  the  largest  difference  between  
liquidity premium and storage cost. Hence an increase in storage costs through a Gesell tax 
would, in principle, counteract  the high liquidity premium of money, but would not affect the 
liquidity premium of other durable assets, such as gold. Consequently, their somewhat smaller 
liquidity premium would still  set a minimum standard for the long-term interest rate. This 
view was already expressed by Keynes (1936, p. 358) himself: ‘Thus if currency notes were to 
be deprived of their liquidity-premium by the stamping system, a long series of substitutes 
would step into their shoes – bank-money, debts at call, foreign money, jewellery and the 
precious metals generally, and so forth’. Hence, in the long run a tax on money will not lower 
real  interest  rates  substantially  and  thereby  succeed  in  abolishing  the  ills  of  capitalism 
completely,  as  many  of  Gesell’s  followers  claim.  Therefore    negative  short  term  nominal 
interest rates are – from a Post Keynesian perspective – no remedy towards the effects of 




The aim of this paper was to give a concise review of the various theoretical origins of 
negative  interest  rates,  which  so  far  have  been  unconnected  in  the  literature.  Evidently, 
negative interest rates have come a long way from anarchistic to modern economic theory. 
Even if their origins are to be found in a rather simplistic economic theory, which nevertheless 
Keynes vividly embraced as being prophetic, various prominent economists have picked up the 
proposal and have shown its value as an additional monetary policy tool. Instead of being the 
fantasy of a monetary crank, negative interest rates draw on a variety of different modern 
theoretical backgrounds. 
Our review of the various strands of research suggests that a moderate tax on money may be 
efficiency  enhancing  (in  the  absence  of  inflation)  and  implementing  the  infrastructure  for 
setting negative nominal interest rates may give central banks an additional valuable policy 
tool in case of a large deflationary shock. A beneficial side effect could be that the velocity of 
circulation of coins and notes and probably demand deposits might be considerably more 
stable if subjected to the Gesell tax and this could render monetary control more efficient. 
Given that many developed economies have reached the lower zero bound, with central banks 
unable to combat unemployment and depression, we believe that there is a need for further 
extensive  research,  especially  in  models  with  more  relevant  specifications  of  production, 
investment, banking, and asset markets, and where money plays an essential role in exchange. 
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